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THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN GERMANY
Craig M. Bradley'
The exclusionary rule that the Supreme Court has fashioned to
suppress evidence obtained unconstitutionally is directed at least
in part toward deterring police conduct that violates constitutional
norms. Since the inception of the rule, the value and efficacy of a
prescript that excludes otherwise relevant and probative evidence
in a factfinding proceeding has been a subject of heated debate. In
this Article, Professor Bradley examines the rather different exclu-
sionary rules used in Germany. He argues that a comparison of
exclusionary rules in Germany and the United States suggests that
a number of different policies of a criminal justice system could
inspire such rules but that the two countries share the ultimate goal
of protecting the constitutional rights of the accused.
IN the ongoing debate over the continued existence and scope
of the American exclusionary rule, critics of the rule, such
as Chief Justice Burger, often have claimed that it is "unique
to American jurisprudence."' The assertion that the United
States is the only country with an exclusionary rule is an
impressive one, and Judge Malcolm Wilkey is not alone in
arguing that "one proof of the irrationality of the exclusionary
rule is that no other civilized nation in the world has adopted
it. ''2 Defenders of the rule have been able to respond to this
argument only by noting that other countries are often char-
acterized by better police discipline, lower crime rates, or
greater racial or social homogeneity than is the United States
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University at Bloomington. University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, A.B., 1967; University of Virginia, J.D., 1970. The
author is a former Assistant United States Attorney (Washington, D.C.) and Senior
Trial Attorney in the Criminal Division of the United States Department of Justice.
The research for this Article was done at the Max Planck Institute for Criminal
Law, Freiburg, West Germany, on a grant from the Alexander von Humboldt Stif-
tung, whose support I greatly appreciate. I express special thanks to Dr. Thomas
Weigend of the Max Planck Institute, whose help, through all phases of this research
project, was invaluable. I also express my appreciation to Professors Karl-Heinz
G6ssel, John Langbein, and Alex Tanford for their helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this Article.
I Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 4,5 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
2 Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE
215, 26 (1978); see also J. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GER-
MANY 69 (1977) ("The constitutional exclusionary rules are for the most part an
American peculiarity. Illegally obtained evidence is generally admitted not only in




and by suggesting that cross-cultural comparisons are therefore
not meaningful. 3
Both supporters and opponents of the American exclusion-
ary rule thus appear to have accepted the claim that the rule
is unique to the United States. But is it in fact true that no
other country has an exclusionary rule? West Germany, for
example, has been cited as a country in which there is essen-
tially no exclusionary rule, 4 but a closer examination suggests
that this view is incorrect. On the contrary, German law may
require the exclusion from criminal prosecutions of otherwise
relevant and competent evidence solely because the use of such
evidence would violate the constitutional rights of the ac-
cused.5
3 See, e.g., Kamisar, The Exclusionary Rule in Historical Perspective: The Struggle
to Make the Fourth Amendment More than 'An Empty Blessing,' 62 JUDICATURE 337,
348-49 (1979) (citing sources). More recently, Professor Kamisar has noted that
Germany, at least, has a form of exclusionary rule. See Letter from Yale Kamisar to
Michael Klipper, Chief Counsel, Subcommittee on Criminal Law, United States Senate
Judiciary Committee (Mar. 30, 1982) (citing Volkmann-Schluck, Continental European
Criminal Procedures: True or Illusive Model?, 9 Am. J. CRim. L. i, i5-16 (1981)
(German exclusionary rule applies automatically to evidence extorted from accused
through certain abusive means, and applies by discretion to evidence obtained from
intrusion into "the constitutionally protected sphere of fundamental civil rights")),
reprinted in Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary on S. xoi, S. 75i, and S. 1995, 9 7th Cong., ISt & 2d Sess. 527-
28 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
4 See, e.g., Wilkey, supra note 2, at 217. Several academics share this view:
With rare exceptions all evidence is admissible at trial [in Germany] if it
has probative value, even if the methods by which it was obtained were illegal.
A statement given during illegal detention may be used against an accused
unless it was "coerced," in which case it will be excluded because it is unreli-
able, not because it was illegally obtained.
Goldstein & Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial"
Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240, 261 (1977) (footnote omitted).
Nevertlieless, Langbein, as well as Goldstein and Marcus, concedes that coerced
statements represent an exception to the nonexclusion principle. See J. LANGBEIN,
supra note 2, at 69; Goldstein & Marcus, supra, at 261 n.54.
5 See Volkmann-Schluck, Continental European Criminal Procedures: True or
Illusive Model?, 9 AM. J. CaiM. L. i, I5-I6 (298I). There is evidence that exclu-
sionary principles operate in other continental systems as well. See, e.g., Weigend,
Criminal Procedure: Comparative Aspects, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE
(S. Kadish ed. forthcoming 1983) (contraband obtained through illegal searches or
seizures is excluded in cases of serious crime in France); see also Baade, Illegally
Obtained Evidence in Criminal and Civil Cases: A Comparative Study of a Classic
Mismatch (pt. 1), 5I TEX. L. REv. 1325, 1327-28 (1973) (in Great Britain, evidence
obtained by the police in gross disregard of the accused's rights is excludable); Vouin,
France, 52 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 275, 275-77 (196i) (although
illegally seized evidence is not always excluded under French law, the conviction of
a suspected person cannot be based on illegally obtained proof). See generally Baade,
Illegally Obtained Evidence in Criminal and Civil Cases: A Comparative Study of a
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The bases for evidentiary exclusion - termed Beweisver-
wertungsverbote in Germany 6 - fall into two principal cate-
gories. The first is composed of two constitutional doctrines,
the Rechtsstaatsprinzip and the Verhdltnismdissigkeit. Evi-
dence obtained by means of brutality or deceit must be ex-
cluded under the Rechtsstaatsprinzip (principle of a state gov-
erned by the rule of law) to preserve the purity of the judicial
process. 7 If a German court determines that the evidence in
question was not seized through brutality or deceit, it must
then consider whether admission of the evidence would violate
the constitutionally protected privacy interests of the defen-
dant. Under the constitutional doctrine of Verhiltnismdssig-
keit (principle of proportionality), German judges balance, on
a case-by-case basis, the defendant's interests in privacy
against the importance of the evidence and the seriousness of
the offense charged.
In addition, various statutory provisions in the Code of
Criminal Procedure concerning self-incrimination, wiretap-
ping, and witness privileges require the exclusion of evidence
under certain circumstances. Because these statutes are all
founded on constitutional principles, they provide additional
support for the assertion that otherwise competent and relevant
evidence is excluded in Germany for constitutional reasons.
Classic Mismatch (pt. 2), 52 TEX. L. REv. 621 (1974) (discussing the exclusionary
rule in civil cases in West Germany, Scotland, England, Canada, and the United
States, and in criminal cases in the last three jurisdictions).
6 The term literally means "evidentiary use prohibition." It is employed in West
Germany to cover all exclusions of evidence, including those based on competence or
relevance. See, e.g., STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] (Code of Criminal Procedure)
§§ 250-251 (W. Ger.). Unless otherwise indicated, translations of the Strafprozessord-
nung are from THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES: THE GERIMAN
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (H. Niebler trans. 1965). When those translations
are out of date or, in rare cases, at variance with the author's view of how a particular
passage should be rendered in English, the author's translation is offered and noted.
In this Article, the term "exclusionary rule" is applied only to the exclusion of
presumptively relevant and competent evidence on constitutional grounds.
7 See Rogall, Gegenwiirtiger Stand und Entwicklungstendenzen der Lehre von den
Strafprozessualen Beweisverboten, 91 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTS-
WISSENSCHAFT [ZSTW] I, 12 (1979). This focus on the "purity of the judicial process"
is similar to the approach to due process taken by the United States Supreme Court
in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. I65 (1952). In that case, the Court excluded
evidence - obtained by state law enforcement officials who forcibly pumped the
defendant's stomach - on the ground that permitting the use of such evidence in
court would "afford brutality the cloak of law." Id. at 173. The Rochin Court's
focus on "conduct that shocks the conscience," id. at 172, was later modified in Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (i961), the decision that first applied the exclusionary rule to
the states. Since Mapp, American courts have sought to determine whether a given




Despite this fundamental similarity between the functions
of exclusionary rules in Germany and in the United States,
however, the German rule serves ends that are quite different
from those of its American counterpart. Most importantly, the
principal focus of the German exclusionary decisions is not on
deterrence, 8 as has become the case in the United States. 9
Even in cases in which violations of the Rechtsstaatsprinzip
or of a specific statutory provision lead directly to exclusion,
deterrence of future violations is not cited as the primary
justification for the rule, though exclusion obviously has some
influence on police conduct.'( This focus away from deter-
rence has a practical effect in exclusionary decisions involving
the proportionality principle. When the police have not been
guilty of brutality or deceit but have merely violated the rules
of the Code of Criminal Procedure - by conducting a war-
rantless search when a warrant was mandated, for example
- evidence will not be excluded on this basis alone. The
criminal will not automatically go free simply because the
constable has blundered." Rather, the court will attempt to
strike the optimum balance between the protection of the de-
fendant's constitutional rights and the interests of effective law
enforcement, without regard to the legality of the search or
8 Deterrence could hardly be the principal concern of a system that permits the
use of illegally seized evidence in many cases. Moreover, German courts do not cite
deterrence of police misconduct as a justification for exclusion. See, e.g., supra note
7; infra pp. 1043-47, io62.
9 Although recent Supreme Court pronouncements suggest that the primary pur-
pose of the American rule is deterrence of police misconduct, see, e.g., United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (I974), earlier decisions by the Court focused directly
on the need to avoid the appearance of granting judicial sanction to official misconduct
by admitting illegally obtained evidence. When the exclusionary rule was first estab-
lished in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), for example, the Court
maintained that the integrity of the federal courts should not be compromised by the
use of illegally obtained evidence. Id. at 392; see also Hearings, supra note 3, at 465,
498-500 (prepared statement of Prof. Yale Kamisar noting absence of any discussion
of deterrence in the Weeks decision); Halpern, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Mapp
Exclusionary Rule After Stone v. Powell, 82 COLUm. L. REv. I, 5-12 (1982); Mertens
& Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating
the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 376-78 (1981).
This view was accepted by Chief Justice (then Judge) Burger in an article written
in z964, in which he succinctly described the early emphasis of the American exclu-
sionary rule on the "purity of the judicial process": "The Weeks holding . . . rested
on the Court's unwillingness to give even tacit approval to official defiance of consti-
tutional provisions by admitting evidence secured in violation of the Constitution.
The idea of deterrence may be lurking between the lines of the opinion but [it] is not
expressed." Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AI. U.L. REV. 1, 5 (x964).
10 See infra p. 1044 & note 57.
11 This criticism of the American rule was first expressed by Justice (then Judge)
Cardozo in People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, i5o N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
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seizure. 12 As a result, the essential question in American
suppression hearings - did the police break the rules? 13 -
does not figure in the calculus of German courts.14
This balancing approach has led many American commen-
tators to conclude that there is no exclusionary rule in Ger-
many. As noted above, however, the reality is considerably
more complex. This Article analyzes the character of the var-
ious German exclusionary rules in an effort to demonstrate
that the American approach cannot be dismissed as a mere
12 An American court will necessarily apply a balancing test to determine whether
a search or seizure is "reasonable," but this test collapses the questions of legality and
admissibility and answers them simultaneously. Unlike their German counterparts,
who will admit evidence that they concede was illegally obtained, American judges
are constrained to find that evidence was procured legally as a condition of admitting
it. See, e.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 278 (1978) (voluntary testimony
held not to be "fruit of the poisonous tree"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 27 (1968)
(stop and frisk held to be legal). The Supreme Court has once upheld the use of
evidence seized pursuant to an ordinance later declared unconstitutional, but it took
pains to rule that the police action was legal under the circumstances. Michigan v.
De Fillipo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (i979). At procedural stages other than suppression
hearings, the Court has been more willing to engage in balancing, but the balance
weighs deterrent effects, not the degree of infringement of privacy. See, e.g., United
States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 62o, 626-28 (I98O) (permitting admission of illegally
obtained evidence for impeachment purposes); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492-
95 (1976) (balancing the "incremental deterrent effect" against "costs to other values
vital to a rational system of criminal justice" in holding that convictions obtained by
use of evidence gathered in violation of the fourth amendment are not ordinarily open
to habeas corpus attack).
Even the good faith exception of United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5 th
Cir. I98O) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (I98I), does not go as far as the
German approach, because the Germans do not consider the good faith of the police
to be relevant. See Project: Criminal Procedure, 71 GEO. L.J. 339, 436-37 (1982).
But see Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 420-27 (I977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(urging that a balancing test apply to permit admission of evidence when police
misconduct is not "egregious").
13 The focus of American courts that have adopted the "good faith" exception to
the exclusionary rule, see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 833 (5th
Cir. i98o) (en banc) (opinion of Politz, J.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981), is
essentially the same. These courts also profess a deterrence rationale for exclusion,
but note that "a 'police officer will not be deterred from an illegal search if he does
not know that it is illegal."' Id. at 842 (quoting Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free
if the Constable Blunders?, 5o TEX. L. REV. 736, 740 (972)).
14 Three German courts, which are similar to American appellate courts, hear
appeals for error and issue written opinions: the Oberlandesgericht (OLG) (high state
court), of which there are ii (one for each state) and which is the rough equivalent
of a state supreme court; the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) (high federal court or federal
court of appeals), of which there is only one, divided into a civil and a criminal panel;
and the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) (federal constitutional court). There is
no real equivalent to the United States Supreme Court; its function is divided between
the BVerfG and the BGH. Under this division, the final interpretation of federal
statutes (including the Code of Criminal Procedure) lies with the BGH, and the final
interpretation of the constitution lies with the BVerfG.
1036 [Vol. 96:1O32
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aberration from universally accepted norms of law enforce-
ment. In addition, an understanding of the operation of the
German exclusionary rules may serve to broaden current de-
bate by suggesting possible alternatives to the form the rule
now takes in the United States.
I. EXCLUSION BASED ON CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
The German Constitution (the Basic Law, or Grundgesetz)
offers a solid foundation for the protection of individual liberty.
Article i affirms as a fundamental principle that "the dignity
of man is inviolable. To respect and protect it is the duty of
all state authority."' 5 Article 2 establishes that "everyone has
the right to the free development of his personality." 16 More
specifically, article io provides that "secrecy of the mail as
well as secrecy of the postal service and telecommunications is
inviolable. Restrictions may be ordered only on the basis of
law." 17 Likewise, article 13 states that "the home is inviola-
ble" and that "searches may be ordered only by a judge."' i8
In the United States, the broad provisions of the Consti-
tution are fleshed out primarily by judicial holdings that es-
tablish, for example, what constitutes an "unreasonable
search" or an "involuntary confession." 19 In Germany, as in
all civil law countries, this task is performed by the legislature
in a lengthy Code of Criminal Procedure - the Strafprozess-
ordnung - that contains detailed provisions governing all
phases of the criminal justice process and is applicable
throughout the country. Theoretically, the courts clear up
doubts concerning Code provisions only on a case-by-case ba-
sis, and their decisions have no precedential value. In prac-
tice, however, German courts rely on, distinguish, and over-
rule their prior opinions much as courts do in a common law
jurisdiction. 20
15 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. i(i) (W. Ger. 1949, amended 1973).
16 Id. art. 2, para. i.
17 Id. art. io.
18 Id. art. 13(1)-(2). There is an exception to this rule in the event of "danger in
delay," in which case a search may be ordered "by other authorities provided by law."
Id. art. 13(2); see infra p. 1038.
19 U.S. CONST. amends. IV-V; see, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
351 01967).
20 German courts struggle to avoid the (theoretically nonexistent) stare decisis
doctrine by emphasizing that "this case is limited to its facts" or that a prior case is
inapplicable because "it arose in a different factual context." See, e.g., Judgment of
May 26, 1976, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG], W. Ger., 42 Entscbeidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] (decisions of the federal constitutional court) 212,
222 (imposing a specificity requirement on search warrants and distinguishing on its
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Because the relevant constitutional doctrines play perhaps
their most important role in search and seizure cases, it is
useful to have some background understanding of the provi-
sions of the Code governing searches and seizures. Although
these rules are at times quite detailed, by American standards
they offer remarkably little protection against the excesses of
law enforcement authorities. For example, the dwelling and
person of anyone "suspected" of a crime may be searched by
the police "for the purpose of apprehending such person or if
it may be presumed that such search will lead to the discovery
of evidence." ' 2 1 Although article i3 of the Basic Law provides
that searches may be ordered only by a judge, that article and
the Code permit searches to be ordered "by the prosecution
and its auxiliary officials" (the police) if there is "danger in
delay."' 22 Search orders (Durchsuchungsbefehl) need not be of
any particular form, 23 need not be grounded on probable
cause, and may be given orally - or simply dispensed with
- if there is danger in delay.24 Several specific restrictions in
the Code do supplement these comparatively lenient rules, but
those provisions are technical and do not alter the fundamental
laxity-of the statutory provisions.
25
facts an earlier case that had imposed no such requirement). See generally Dama~ka,
Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480, 496-
97 (1975) (discussing how in practice, if not in theory, prior decisions of higher courts
control decisions of lower courts in continental systems).
21 STPO § 102.
22 GG art. 13(2); STPO § IO5. Danger in delay is similar to the exigent circum-
stances exception recognized in the United States. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (x967). It is applied much more liberally in Germany, however, with the
effect that the majority of searches are accomplished without a written warrant.
Interview with a German Prosecutor (May 31, 1982); see Goldstein & Marcus, supra
note 4, at 26o-6i. Because the police may in effect authorize themselves to conduct
a search when there is danger in delay, the practical result of the rule is not to require
a warrant at all in such instances.
23 Under the Rechtsstaatsprinzip, however, the orders must meet certain basic
requirements, such as those discussed at infra pp. 1039-40.
24 1 E. LOwE & W. ROSENBERG, DIE STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG UND DAS GE-
RICHTSVERFASSUNGSGESE'TZ § 105, 4 (23d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as LOWE-
ROSENBERG]. In practice, "[w]arrants are used more often for searches [than for
arrests] but search without a warrant is unquestionably the dominant mode. Most
searches are made with consent or incident to an arrest." Goldstein & Marcus, supra
note 4, at 26o-6i.
25 For example, searches of third-party residences may be undertaken only "if
facts are present, from which it may be concluded that [the person or evidence]
searched for is in the rooms to be searched." STPO § 103(1). This restriction does
not apply, however, to rooms in which the accused has been arrested or into which
he has been pursued. Id. § IO3(II). Night searches of dwellings and business premises
are authorized in exigent circumstances only. Id. § 1o4(I); see also C. ROXIN,
STRAFVERFAHRENSRECHT 199-202 (17th ed. 1982) (citing authorities). Although there
are a number of exceptions to this provision, see, e.g., STPO § 104(01), the restriction
1038 [Vol. 96:1o32
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Moreover, violation of these rules, lax as they are, does
not necessarily result in the suppression of evidence. 26 Evi-
dence thus obtained is excluded in Germany only if the court
determines that permitting its use at trial would violate one of
the two judicially recognized constitutional principles that also
govern searches and seizures - the Rechtsstaatsprinzip and
the principle of Verhltnismiissigkeit. The former is similar to
the American concept of "due process": 27
[It] affords a fair trial before a legally appointed and indepen-
dent judge in which constitutional guarantees are observed;
specifically the dignity of the person, the right to free devel-
opment of the personality, the freedom of the person, the
equality before the law. . . as well as the prohibition against
inhumane treatment. The right to a fair procedure also guar-
antees the accused the right to free counsel in serious cases if
he can't afford to pay .... 28
The Rechtsstaatsprinzip forbids police brutality and deceit
both in the seizure of evidence 29 and in interrogations. 30 It
on night searches contrasts sharply with the frequent absence of such prohibitions
under American law. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § SS
220.2(3) & commentary (1975) (noting that, although 23 states forbid night searches
absent special circumstances, 14 others explicitly permit them, and 12 states and the
District of Columbia have no statute pertaining to night searches). The German Code
also provides that the judge, the prosecutor, a municipal official (not a police officer),
or "two members of the municipality" must be present at searches "if possible," STPO
§ 105(HI), and that the occupant is entitled to be present as well; if the occupant is
absent, a representative shall be called "if possible." Id. § xo6(I). If police do not
comply with this section - in other words, if it is possible to obtain witnesses and
the police do not - the subject of the search has a legal right to resist the search
and exercise self-defense, but police failure to comply with this provision will not
result in exclusion of the evidence seized. See i LOWE-ROSENBERG, supra note 24,
§ 105, 12 (citing cases). After a search, the person affected must be informed in
writing of the reason for the search, and a list of things seized or a certificate that
nothing incriminating was found must be issued on demand. STPO § 1o7. There are
also detailed restrictions with regard to the treatment of private papers. See id. §§ 97,
11o.
26 See infra pp. 1040-41, 1046. The contrast with American search and seizure
law is striking. Searches may be performed on mere "suspicion," rather than probable
cause, and a written search warrant is frequently not used at all in Germany. Most
significantly for the purposes of this Article, violation of a search order requirement
or failure to provide the required information does not lead to the exclusion of evidence
derived from the search.
27 The Rechtsstaatsprinzip derives from article 20 of the Basic Law, which provides
that "[legislation shall be subject to the constitutional order; the executive and the
judiciary shall be bound by law and justice." GG art. 20, para. 3.
28 T. KLEINKNECHT, STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG Einleitung 19 (3 3d ed. 1977)
(citations omitted).
29 Judgment of Mar. i7, 1971, Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], W. Ger., 24 Ent-
scheidungen des Bundesgerichtshof in Strafsachen [BGHSt] (decisions of the federal
appeals court panel for criminal cases) 125, 131.
30 The rules forbidding brutality and deceit in interrogation are statutory, see
1983] 1039
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also requires that a search order specify the crime being in-
vestigated and the nature of the evidence being sought, at least
when such disclosures would not unduly interfere with the
investigation. 3 1
Although evidence must be excluded if the seizure itself
was in violation of the Rechtsstaatsprinzip,32 regardless of its
probative value or the seriousness of the crime under investi-
gation, 33 the practical effect of this broad exclusion is limited
by the fact that the German courts analyze searches and sei-
zures separately. Thus, in a case in which a search order
violated the Rechsstaatsprinzip because it failed to specify the
crime being investigated and the evidence sought, this consti-
tutional defect alone did not lead to suppression of the evidence
seized pursuant to the order.34 Instead, the seizure was eval-
uated independently of the illegal search to determine whether
it had been accomplished through brutality or deceit. 35 The
court reasoned that the question of the validity of the search
itself was not properly presented, 3 6 because the seizure was
the actual source of the evidence. 3 7 As a result, unconstitu-
STPO § 136a, but the statute in turn rests on constitutional principles. See infra pp.
1049-50.
31 Judgment of May 24, I977, BVerfG, 44 BVerfG 353, 371; Judgment of May
26, I976, BVerfG, 42 BVerfG 212, 220.
32 T. KLEINKNECHT, supra note 28, Einleitung 54.
33 Id.; cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. I65 (1952) (excluding brutally seized
evidence on due process grounds in a decision preceding extension of the exclusionary
rule to the states).
34 See Judgment of May 24, 1977, BVerfG, 44 BVerfG 353.
35 Id. at 371-72; see infra p. io46. In this case, the seizure was held unconsti-
tutional for essentially the same reason for which the search was held unconstitutional:
the police were not investigating a specific crime, and a "fishing expedition" could
not justify an action as intrusive as the seizure of the private medical records of a
drug rehabilitation clinic. If, however, the police had found illegal narcotics rather
than merely medical records, it is likely that the evidence would not have been
suppressed, despite the defects in the search; in deciding in favor of exclusion, the
court placed great emphasis on the private nature of the evidence seized.
36 Accord Judgment of May 26, 1976, BVerfG, 42 BVerfG 212, 218. In this earlier
case, the court did not conclude that it would never exclude evidence on the basis of
an illegal search, but found that the issue was not ripe.
37 See Judgment of May 24, 1977, BVerfG, 44 BVerfG at 383-84. In view of the
fact that the German Constitution guarantees the inviolability of the home - GG
art. 13; see Judgment of May 26, 1976, BVerfG, 42 BVerfG at 219 - this distinction
makes little sense. Breaking down the door of a house to find evidence is certainly
as serious an intrusion as snatching the evidence from the defendant's hand. Because
the German system provides alternate grounds to exclude evidence, however, this
distinction does not create as much mischief in Germany as it might in the United
States. This point is illustrated by the Supreme Court's decision in Irvine v. Califor-
nia, 347 U.S. 128 (1954). When police broke into the defendant's home and installed
a microphone, the Court condemned the police behavior as a flagrant violation of the
fourth amendment, id. at 132, but declined to exclude the evidence (the conversations
[Vol. 96:1O321040
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tional seizures will lead directly to suppression, 38 whereas un-
constitutional searches and merely illegal seizures (those that
violate the rules of criminal procedure) will not necessarily
have that effect. 39
The second relevant constitutional principle is that of Ver-
hiiltnismdssigkeit (principle of proportionality). 40 Under this
doctrine, the methods used in fighting crime must be propor-
tional to the "seriousness of the offense and the strength of the
suspicion" 4 1 as well as to the constitutional interests at stake;
thus, what would be appropriate in some cases may not be
justifiable in others. The courts also employ a form of "least
drastic means" analysis when assessing police actions under
the principle of proportionality: if less intrusive measures will
suffice, a greater intrusion will not be permitted. 42 This ap-
proach is illustrated by the federal constitutional court's Judg-
ment of June io, I963,4 3 in which the taking of spinal fluid
from a suspect to determine his possible insanity, though gen-
erally authorized by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 4 4 was
held to be out of proportion to the misdemeanor charge against
the suspect. 45
of the occupants), because the Court had not yet held the exclusionary rule applicable
to the states. Id. at 132-34; see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 665 (I96i). In Germany, the courts would have no
difficulty excluding such evidence, not because of illegal police behavior, but because
private conversations in the home generally are not admissible, however obtained.
See generally infra pp. 1044-46 (discussing the tape recording case).
33 Judgment of May 24, 1977, BVerfG, 44 BVerfG at 383-84.
39 Thus, a night search that is prohibited by STPO § 104, for example, can
nevertheless yield admissible evidence unless use of that evidence would violate the
principle of proportionality, see infra p. 1041.
40 Although the principle of proportionality is also considered to be a component
of the Rechtsstaatsprinzip, see K. HESSE, GRUNDZOGE DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 77 (i2th ed. I98O), in the German decisions it is
usually discussed as a separate principle.
41 T. KLEINKNECHT, supra note 28, Einleitung 20.
42 Judgment of Aug. 5, 1966, BVerfG, 2o BVerfG 62, 187; see also Carr, Wire-
tapping in West Germany, 29 AM. J. Comtp. L. 607 (I98i) (discussing application of
this doctrine in wiretapping cases).
43 BVerfG, i6 BVerfG 194.
44
A physical examination of the accused may be ordered for the ascertainment
of facts, which are important for the proceeding. For this purpose the taking
of blood samples and other penetrations of the body, made by a physician
pursuant to the rules of medical science . . . are permissible without the consent
of the accused, provided no resulting detriment to his health is to be feared.
STPO § 8ia.
45 Judgment of June io, 1963, BVerfG, x6 BVerfG at 202. Because this case arose
on appeal from the order authorizing examination, the evidence was never obtained,
and the question of suppression was not directly addressed. See also Judgment of
Aug. 5, 1966, BVerfG, 2o BVerfG 62, 187 (holding that search of a press room
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German courts therefore engage in a two-step analysis
when addressing constitutionally based challenges to the use
of evidence. First, the court determines whether the evidence
at issue was seized or obtained in violation of the Rechtsstaats-
prinzip. In cases in which there is a violation, the judiciary
must exclude the evidence to preserve the purity of the judicial
process (Reinheit des Verfahrens).4 6 If the evidence is not
excluded in the first step, the court then considers the principle
of Verhiltnismlissigkeit (proportionality). Weighing the appro-
priate factors, the court decides whether to use the evidence
in question. If the court determines that the individual privacy
rights of the accused outweigh the societal interest in the pre-
sentation of all relevant evidence, 4 7 the evidence will be ex-
cluded - without considering whether the police originally
obtained the evidence legally.
The mechanics of the German system are demonstrated by
three cases in which the courts excluded a diary,48 a tape
recording of a private conversation, 4 9 and the files of a drug
rehabilitation clinic5o on the ground that use of the evidence
in court would violate the privacy rights of the defendant.
The courts reached these results even though the legality of
the seizures was conceded in the first two cases. In the Diary
Case,5 s the federal court of appeals considered whether the
defendant's diary was properly admissible in a perjury trial.
The police had been given the diary by the wife of the defen-
dant's paramour, in whose home it had been concealed. Ap-
plying the balancing test required by the principle of propor-
tionality, the court reversed the defendant's conviction on the
ground that using the defendant's private diary against her in
court violated her privacy rights under articles i and 2 of the
constitution.5 2 The court emphasized, however, that the mere
requires a higher standard of cause than do other searches; such a search "must
promise success in producing appropriate evidence," rather than be grounded on mere
suspicion.)
46 But see Rogall, supra note 7, at i, 12 (discussing and criticizing the focus on
the purity-of-the-process doctrine).
47 See generally i LOWE-ROSENBERG, supra note 24, Einleitung ch. 14, I
(observing that the search for truth in criminal investigations is limited by the com-
mands of justice, which forbid investigatory means that "are unreasonable, violate
the proportionality principle, offend human dignity, or are not related to the devel-
opment of truth," and claiming that "[t]he exclusionary rules serve the purpose of
enforcing these interests").
48 Judgment of Feb. 21, 1964, BGH, 19 BGHSt 325.
49 Judgment of Jan. 31, 1973, BVerfG, 34 BVerfG 238.
50 Judgment of May 24, 1977, BVerfG, 44 BVerfG 353.
51 Judgment of Feb. 21, 1964, BGH, i9 BGHSt 325.
52 Id. at 326-27; GG art. 2, para. 2. The Diary Case was the first to hold
explicitly that exclusion could be based on a violation of constitutional rights. The
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fact that the defendant's privacy rights were implicated did
not automatically require exclusion, and stressed that exclusion
was appropriate in this instance because the gravity of the
intrusion outweighed the minor nature of the criminal charge.
The court suggested that a criminal's diary entries concerning
his felonies, or a foreign agent's entries concerning his spying
activities, would not be protected, because the interests of the
state in prosecuting the offense would outweigh the privacy
interests of the defendant.5 3 Similarly, business papers that
did not expose the personality of the author would not be
excluded, because there would be no privacy interest to weigh
against the state's interest in securing the admissibility of all
relevant evidence.5 4
This case illustrates some of the differences between the
operation of exclusionary rules in Germany and in the United
States. In the United States, the diary would have been ad-
missible because it was obtained without police misconduct,55
whereas a gun obtained pursuant to a defective search warrant
would have been excluded.5 6 In contrast, the diary was ex-
cluded in Germany, whereas an illegally seized gun would be
admissible because its use would not interfere with the free
development of the defendant's personality. Only a brutal or
deceitful seizure that violated the defendant's most fundamen-
tal constitutional rights under the Rechsstaatsprinzip would
result in exclusion of a gun. A diary is subject to different
treatment, however, because its use in court constitutes a harsh
court reached this result even though the exclusionary provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure - for example, STPO § 136a, which excludes coerced confessions
- were not applicable, see infra pp. 1049-62, and thereby prepared the way for the
subsequent expansion of the exclusionary rule based on the broad constitutional
principles discussed above. The basic concept of exclusion, however, is not a new
one in Germany; it was first set forth in 19o3. E. BELING, DIE BEWEISVERBOTE ALS
GRENZEN DER WAHRHEITSERFORSCHUNG II STRAFPROZESS IN STRAFRECHTLICHE
ABHANDLUNGEN (THE EXCLUSIONARY RULES AS THE BORDERS OF THE SEARCH FOR
TRUTH IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE) Heft 46, at 37 (1903).
53 Judgment of Feb. 21, 1964, BGH, ig BGHSt at 331.
54 Id.
5 The diary would be admissible in the United States even if it were turned over
to the police by a thief who had ransacked the defendant's home. See Burdeau v.
McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 476 (1921). The focus in the United States is on police
misconduct, without regard to whether a substantial invasion of the defendant's
privacy has occurred. But see Bradley, Constitutional Protection for Private Papers,
16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 461 (i98i) (arguing that past Supreme Court decisions
and constitutional theory provide support for the proposition that private papers
should receive greater constitutional protection than do guns and narcotics).




incursion on an individual's personal privacy, whether or not
it was legally obtained.
By excluding a legally seized diary but holding that diaries
or other private personal papers may be used as evidence in
prosecutions of more serious crimes, the court in the Diary
Case gave the police little guidance in deciding when such
documents should be seized. As the case indicated, the ad-
missibility of all evidence - unless seized in violation of the
Rechtsstaatsprinzip or a statute requiring exclusion - is open
to consideration by the court, which decides on an ad hoc
basis whether to admit or exclude. Thus, the purpose of the
German exclusionary rule is clearly not to deter police miscon-
duct.57 Instead, through balancing, the rule operates to max-
imize privacy interests consistently with society's interest in
prosecuting serious crimes. 58
The dimensions of this protected sphere of personal privacy
were further clarified in Judgment of January 31, I973, 59 in
which the federal constitutional court first employed a three-
tiered analysis (Dreistufentheorie)60 to determine whether evi-
dence must be excluded because of its intrusive effect. A
married couple, the B's, sold residential and business property
to the defendant. The defendant arranged with the B's to
understate the actual price on the contract so that the property
would be valued at a lower figure for tax purposes. The
defendant paid the difference (70,000 DM) to the B's in cash.
Unknown to the defendant, the B's had tape-recorded some
of the conversations relating to this tax fraud; they subse-
quently turned over the tapes to the police on their own ini-
tiative. 6 1
The court identified three different levels of constitutional
protection for evidence of this character. 62 It observed that,
57 See, e.g., G6ssel, Kritische Beinerkungen zum gegenwartigen Stand der Lehre
von den Beweisverboten irn Strafrverfahren, 34 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT
[NJW] 649, 651 (198i). But see F. DENCKER, VERVERTUNGSVERBOTE IM STRAFPRO-
ZESS 52 & n. 169 (1977). Dencker notes that some scholars contend that the rule should
have a deterrent purpose, id. at 52 n.169, but concludes that it "is not possible to
assume that the legislature created the 'evidence use prohibitions' for disciplinary
reasons .... The disciplinary effect is only a welcome ancillary effect of the 'evidence
use prohibitions' that are in existence for other reasons." Id. at 53, 55.
58 The efficient administration of justice is itself a constitutionally guaranteed
interest. Judgment of May 24, 1977, BVerfG, 44 BVerfG 353, 374.
59 BVerfG, 34 BVerfG 238.
60 This term is that used by G6ssel, supra note 57, at 655.
61 Judgment of Jan. 31, 1973, BVerfG, 34 BVerfG at 247.
62 A court will engage in this analysis only after determining that the seizure of
evidence did not violate the Rechtsstaatsprinzip. In this case, of course, the seizure
was not at issue.
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in cases in which the use of evidence would violate the most
basic or central rights of an individual (Kernbereich), "the
dignity of the person is inviolable and prevails against all
governmental power." 63 Such evidence, the court held, must
be excluded, regardless of the seriousness of the charge. Al-
though the court cited three articles of the Basic Law as
sources of this inviolable "intimate sphere of the individual,"64
these provisions are general and provide virtually no guidance
concerning the boundaries of the Kernbereich.65 In this in-
stance, the court held that the taped conversations fell not
within the inviolable inner sphere, but rather within a second,
"private sphere" (Privatbereich), which could be intruded
upon, but only in the event of an overriding public interest. 66
The privacy interests of the defendant did not automatically
outweigh all other factors; instead, as in the Diary Case, they
were subjected to a balancing process (Abwdgung). The court
concluded that the interests of the state in this case were not
sufficiently strong to permit use of the tapes, 67 but cautioned
that the result might have been different had the defendant
been charged with a crime of violence rather than with tax
fraud. 68
The court also outlined the scope of the third level of
protection, which is applicable in all cases in which the private
personality of the defendant is not revealed by the evidence in
question. Because the defendant's privacy rights would not be
violated by its admission, evidence falling into this category
- such as a tape recording of a business meeting - could
63 Judgment of Jan. 31, 1973, BVerfG, 34 BVerfG at 245.
64 Id. (citing GG art. i, para. i ("The dignity of man is inviolable. To respect it
and protect it is the duty of all state authority."); id. art. 2, para. x ("Everyone has
a right to free development of his personality, insofar as he does not infringe upon
the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral code."); id.
art. i9, para. 2 ("In no case may a basic right be infringed upon in its essential
context.")).
65 German courts have not yet excluded evidence on the ground that it falls within
the Kernbereich. See Judgment of Nov. 8, 1978, Oberlandesgericht [OLG], Bayern,
51 NJW 2624, 2625. Evidence secured through the electronic bugging of a married
couple's bedroom might be an example of the type of material that would fall within
the Kernbereich.
66 Judgment of Jan. 31, 1973, BVerfG, 34 BVerfG at 246-47.
67 Id. at 248. This case arose when a public prosecutor sought a court order
approving the seizure of documents. Id. at 242. The defendant appealed the order,
and the case eventually reached the federal constitutional court. The court refused
to admit the tapes as evidence, but did not prohibit the introduction of documents
that were seized as a consequence of the delivery of the tapes to the police. Thus,
the court did not bar the use of the questioned evidence as an investigatory tool, but
only its direct use as evidence at trial.
68 Id. at 248.
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never be excluded under the proportionality principle. 69 The
court reasoned that the conversation in the case before it was
not such an unprotected matter, because only three individu-
als, rather than a large group of people, were involved.70
In the two cases discussed above, the German courts en-
gaged in an exercise foreign to American courts - excluding
legally seized evidence on the ground that the evidence itself
was too private to be used. 7 1 The federal constitutional court
extended this reasoning in Judgment of May 24, 1977,72 which
involved the search and seizure of the medical records of a
narcotics rehabilitation clinic. First, in declaring the search
unconstitutional under the Rechtsstaatsprinzip,73 the court
noted that the search order failed to specify any particular
crime as the subject of the investigation, to name any partic-
ular defendant, or to identify the evidence sought. Instead,
the court found, the search was a fishing expedition for nar-
cotics violations that might exist at the clinic. 74
The court's conclusion that the search was unconstitutional
did not resolve the question whether the evidence could be
used. Resolution of the exclusion issue depended on a finding
either that the seizure was unconstitutional or that, balancing
all the relevant factors, the privacy interests of the defendant
outweighed the state's interest in using the evidence. 75 Be-
cause the seizure was not accomplished through brutality or
deceit, and consequently did not violate the Rechtsstaats-
prinzip, the court turned to the three sublevels of analysis used
69 Id. at 247. In a subsequent case, the court called this third level the "allgemeine
Handlungsfreiheit," or general freedom to act. Judgment of May 24, 1977, BVerfG,
44 BVerfG 353, 372-73. That is, one is free to hold business meetings, for example,
but the discussions are not entitled to special constitutional protection.
70 Judgment of Jan. 31, 1973, BVerfG, 34 BVerfG at 247. Actually, the court
said that the "conversation took place under six eyes." Id.
71 But see Boyd v. United States, i6 U.S. 616, 630 (i886). In Boyd, the Court
ordered the suppression of private papers on the ground that such evidence, by its
nature, was too private to be used. The Boyd Court also found, however, that the
means by which the evidence was obtained (a summons) was illegal.
72 BVerfG, 44 BVerfG 353.
13 Id. at 373-74.
74 Id. at 37I.
75 If the seizure had been accomplished through brutality (that is, if the seizure,
as opposed to the search, had violated the Rechtsstaatsprinzip), any evidence seized
would have been excluded. Although the unconstitutionality of the search under the
Rechtsstaatsprinzip is not dispositive, this consideration clearly affects the outcome of
the balancing test. Of course, if the challenged evidence had been illegal narcotics
paraphernalia rather than medical records, there would have been no privacy issue,
and the evidence would have been admissible despite the unconstitutionality of the
search. See Judgment of May 24, 1977, BVerfG, 44 BVerfG at 383-84; Judgment of
Mar. 17, 1971, BGH, 24 BGHSt 125, 131.
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under the proportionality principle. The court held that the
evidence in question, the medical records of the clinic's pa-
tients, fell into the second category of the Dreistufentheorie,
the Privatbereich.76 After weighing the competing interests of
society in criminal prosecutions and of the individual in the
development of his personality, the court noted that society
also has a strong interest in encouraging people to seek treat-
ment for narcotics addiction and other health problems. 77 The
court concluded that this interest was a sufficient basis for
exclusion of the medical records. 78 Once again, however, the
court cautioned that in an investigation of serious crimes -
or in a properly limited search for specific narcotics violations
- seizure and use of such records might be appropriate. 79
Although these cases leave vague the boundaries of the
various theories of exclusion, several significant points do
emerge. The most notable is that deterrence of police miscon-
duct is not the primary goal of the German exclusionary rules.
Even when evidence is excluded because its seizure involved
police brutality, the principal justification for exclusion is not
to punish the police, but to maintain the integrity of the judicial
process.8 0 Similarly, under the proportionality principle, the
76 Judgment of May 24, 1977, BVerfG, 44 BVerfG at 372.
77 Id. at 375.
73 Id. at 373.
79 Id. at 379. In a similar case, the federal constitutional court held that
information from a doctor's files concerning his treatment of the defendant, although
not within the intimate sphere (Intinsphdre) - the court had not yet developed the
term Kernbereich - were within the Privatbereich (private sphere) of the accused.
Judgment of May 8, 1972, BVerfG, 32 BVerfG 373, 379. On balance, the court held,
use of the files at the trial of the accused for extortion was reversible error, even
though the files were seized pursuant to a valid search order. Id. at 379-8o. This
case shows that the court's balancing process will be resolved in favor of the defendant
even in a case involving a charge as serious as extortion. See also Judgment of Jan.
15, 5970, BVerfG, 27 BVerfG 344 (files of a divorce proceeding held to fall within
the Privatbereich).
80 See generally Judgment of May 24, 1977, BVerfG, 44 BVerfG at 372 (criticizing
not the police, whom the court considered out of its control, but the judge who issued
the warrant). That deterrence of police misconduct is not the focus of the German
decisions is further illustrated by Judgment of Mar. 17, 1971, BGH, 24 BGHSt 125,
in which the federal court of appeals held that a blood sample taken from the
defendant by a medical assistant on instructions of the police - in violation of § 8ia
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which requires a doctor to take blood samples,
STPO § 8ia - could be used as evidence in a case involving drunken driving. The
court concluded that the damage to the defendant's right of physical inviolability, see
GG art. 2, para. 2, had already been done. It noted that admission of the evidence
thus obtained would not further intrude on the defendant's body, that blood alcohol
percentage was not a private matter, and that consequently there was no point in
exclusion. Judgment of Mar. 17, x971, BGH, 24 BGHSt at 131. The court held that
such evidence could be excluded only if it were obtained in such an outrageous fashion
- for example, through deliberate deceit (in this case, the police did not realize that
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mere fact that a search violates the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure is not determinative; the important question is whether
the degree of intrusion upon the defendant's privacy rights can
be justified in view of the nature of the offense charged.
Although the German system admittedly offers less protection
for civil liberties than does the American exclusionary rule, it
also avoids the most objectionable feature of the American
system - that a confessed murderer may be allowed to go
free because of an error by the police - and may therefore
command a greater degree of public sympathy and support.
The emphasis that these three cases place on protecting the
privacy rights of criminal defendants from infringement in the
courtroom - as opposed to deterring future police misconduct
- results in a number of interesting divergences between
American and German evidentiary doctrine. For example,
evidence delivered to the police by private individuals may be
suppressed in Germany if its admission in court would impinge
on individual privacy. 8' The Germans do not distinguish be-
tween private actions and police actions in this regard; the
primary concern is the effect of using the evidence in court,
not how it became available. In the United States, on the
other hand, privately obtained evidence is admissible even if
it has been acquired by means that would result in exclusion
if employed by law enforcement officials. 82 This difference in
perspective is also reflected by the differing attitudes of Amer-
ican and German courts toward the admissibility of audio and
video recordings. As a result of their concern with preserving
the defendant's privacy rights, German courts tend to view
such evidence with a certain amount of uneasiness, although
this disfavor will not always result in exclusion.8 3 American
courts, on the other hand, have applauded the use of this type
of evidence because of its unusually high probative value.8 4
the medical assistant who drew the blood was not a doctor) - that its use in court
would violate the Rechtsstaatsprinzip. Id. at 131-32. Under the same reasoning, the
examination of a woman by a nondoctor, in violation of § 81d(i) of the Code, would
not lead to the exclusion of evidence. i LWE-ROSENBERG, supra note 24, § 8id,
8. If deterrence of official misconduct were the focus of the German rule, such
violations by officials would lead to exclusion.
81 See, e.g., Judgment of Feb. 21, 1964, BGH, i9 BGHSt 325 (the Diary Case),
discussed at supra pp. 1042-44.
82 See, e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (privately obtained evi-
dence is admissible even if evidence would have been inadmissible if obtained by the
government).
83 For example, use of a tape recording would be appropriate in a kidnapping
case in which the phone calls of the kidnapper had been recorded. See Judgment of
June 14, i96o, BGH, 14 BGHSt 358, 361; C. RoXIN, supra note 25, at 128.
84 See, e.g., United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 604 (3d Cir.) (describing
videotape evidence, in one of the Abscam cases, as "some of the most valuable tools
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Finally, as the Diary Case illustrates, private papers are ac-
corded greater constitutional protection in Germany than in
the United States.8 5
I. EXCLUSION BASED ON STATUTES
The exclusionary principles discussed in Part I are based
directly on the German Constitution, not on the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure; the Code does not require exclusion as a sup-
plement to any of the general rules regarding searches and
seizures. Other provisions of the Code,8 6 however, contain
specific exclusionary rules that prohibit the use in court of any
evidence obtained through violation of those provisions. Al-
though these provisions are statutory, they are nevertheless
"constitutional" in character; each prohibition was established
to protect specific constitutional rights. Thus, like the Amer-
ican exclusionary rule, these provisions operate to exclude oth-
erwise competent and relevant evidence that is obtained
through violations of constitutional rights. Because these stat-
utory prohibitions operate more automatically than the judicial
"balancing" doctrines discussed in Part I, they may be more
effective in discouraging police misconduct. Any deterrent ef-
fect, however, is incidental to the fundamental purpose of
protecting the privacy and dignity of the individual.
A. Coerced Confessions
The most explicit German exclusionary rule is stated in
section 136a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which pro-
vides as follows:
I. The freedom of the accused to determine and to exercise
his will shall not be impaired by ill-treatment, by fatigue, by
physical interference, by dispensing medicines, by torture, by
deception or by hypnosis. . . .[Threats of illegal treatment
are also prohibited.]
II. Measures which impair the accused person's ability to
remember or to comprehend are not permitted.
HI. The prohibitions of subsections I and II apply irre-
spective of the accused person's consent. Statements which
possible"), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2906 (1982); People v. Teicher, 52 N.Y.2d 638,
422 N.E.2d 5o6, 439 N.Y.S.2d 846 (i98i) (videotaping of sex crime by dentist held
reasonable under the fourth amendment).
85 See Bradley, supra note 55; cf. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976)
(authorizing the seizure and use of the defendant's private business papers).




were obtained in violation of these prohibitions may not be
used even if the accused agrees to said use.8 7
This provision is based on the constitutional principles that
"the dignity of man is inviolable" 8 8 and that "everyone has
the right to the free development of his personality."'8 9 It has
been applied to exclude evidence in a wide variety of situations
- a case in which the accused confessed after being arrested
at 5:oo a.m. and deprived of sleep for thirty hours, 90 for
example, and another in which the police confronted the ac-
cused with the corpse of the victim (the accused's own three-
year-old son) to induce him to make a statement. 91 Section
136a also forbids the use of lie detectors. 92 Moreover, in com-
bination with another section of the Code, section x36a pro-
hibits the introduction of evidence obtained from witnesses by
means that would violate section i36a if used against the
accused. 93 If, however, the accused or the witness freely
chooses to repeat a statement originally obtained in violation
of the statute, the second statement may be used as evidence. 94
Because it is an automatic rule of exclusion, section i36a
does not permit the balancing of criminal justice considerations
and privacy interests that is possible under the principle of
proportionality. Instead, all evidence obtained in violation of
the statute must be excluded, regardless of its probative value
or the seriousness of the case. Not surprisingly, the courts
have taken a narrow view of the scope of this provision. To
date, no fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine (Fernwirkungsef-
fekt) attaches to section i36a violations, and illegally obtained
87 STPO § 136a (emphasis added). Although the specific terms of § 136a apply
only to examination of the accused in court, § 163a(III)-(IV) of the Code extends
§ 136a to examination by police and prosecutors.
88 GG art. 1, para. x; see Judgment of Feb. 6, 1954, BGH, 5 BGHSt 332, 333-
34; T. KLEINKNECHT, supra note 28, § 136a, i (discussing the constitutional bases
for § 136a).
89 GG art. 2, para. x; T. KLEINKNECHT, supra note 28, § 136a, i.
90 Judgment of Mar. 24, 1959, BGH, 13 BGHSt 6o.
91 Judgment of Oct. 7, 196o, BGH, I BGHSt 187. The practice of confronting
the accused with evidence - including, in some cases, corpses - is not completely
forbidden. T. KLEINKNECHT, supra note 28, § 136a, 7.
92 See Judgment of Feb. i6, 1954, BGH, 5 BGHSt at 333-34 (asserting that the
use of lie detectors overcomes the defendant's free will).
93 STPO § 163a(V) (applying the requirements of § I36a, inter alia, to examination
of witnesses or experts by police or prosecutors).
94 Judgment of Apr. 30, 1968, BGH, 22 BGHSt 129, 134; see i LOWE-ROSENBERG,
supra note 24, § 136a, 5o. It has been held that, if the defendant appears to be
under the influence of an earlier police misconduct when he repeats a statement, the




leads and clues may be used to uncover admissible evidence. 95
Section 136a also does not apply to statements or confessions
made to third parties (Drittwirkung) unless those parties were
acting at the instigation of the police. 96 Finally, the doctrine
of in dubio pro reo (all doubts resolved in favor of the defen-
dant) is not applicable to alleged section 136a violations. 97
The prohibitions of section 136a are widely accepted in
Germany, and the police generally strive to obey them. A
companion provision, however, has spawned considerably
more controversy. Section 136 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, like the Miranda doctrine in the United States,9" pro-
vides that "[i]t shall be pointed out to [the accused] that the
law grants him the right to respond to the accusation, or not
to answer regarding the charge, and at all times, even before
his examination, to consult with defense counsel of his
choice." 99 One of the more glaring examples of the courts'
reluctance to enforce this rule is Judgment of April 30, 1968. 100
The defendant in that case, suspected of vehicular homicide,
was unable to speak because of a jaw injury. He was never-
theless questioned in a hospital the day after the accident and
made incriminating statements in writing without having been
advised of his section 136 rights. The writing was not used
in court, but a policeman testified to the defendant's declara-
tions. 10 ' The federal appeals court concluded after discussion
that the legislature did not intend the absolute exclusionary
rule of section 136a to apply to a violation of section 136, and
thus a police violation of the latter would not result in exclu-
sion. 10 2
95 T. KLEINKNECHT, supra note 28, § 136a, 21. But see Judgment of Apr. iS,
198o, BGH, 29 BGHSt 244 (applying the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine to a
violation of the wiretap statute).
96 See i LOwE-ROSENBERG, supra note 24, § i36a, 6 (citing cases).
97 Judgment of June 28, i96i, BGH, 16 BGHSt 164.
93 M1iranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966).
99 STPO § 136(I). By its terms, § 136 applies only to the defendant's preliminary
examination by a judge. Nevertheless, STPO § i63a(IV) specifically requires the police
to advise the defendant of his rights under § 136(1) before any police examination of
him.
100 BGH, 22 BGHSt 129.
101 Id. at 172-73.
102 Id. at 174-75 (citing authorities). The court left open the possibility that a
defendant might be so misled or confused by the police that his confession could be
said to have been obtained by deception in the sense of § 136a, in which case the
confession would be excluded. Id. at I75-76. The court cited Judgment of Aug. 30,
1967, OLG, Bremen, 2o NJW 2022. In that case, the court held that, when a
defendant who has not been told of his rights and is in ignorance of them makes a
statement to the police, use of that statement at trial constitutes reversible error
because the statement was obtained by deception in violation of § 136a. It is not
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This decision was the subject of considerable criticism in
the legal literature, 10 3 and the court subsequently reconsidered
the issue in a different context. In Judgment of May 14,
1974,104 the federal appeals court held that the failure of a
judge to instruct the defendant of his right not to testify at
trial, an instruction required by section 243(IV) of the Code, ' 0 5
constituted reversible error. 10 6 The court placed the burden
of proof on the defendant, however, to show that he had
intended not to speak and that he had spoken only out of
ignorance of his right to remain silent.' 0 7 The court distin-
guished its earlier holding on the ground that the rules that
govern testimony at trial are not necessarily applicable to pre-
trial procedures, and asserted that the earlier case was still
good law.' 08 Some commentators have termed this distinction
highly illogical and have suggested that the opinion should be
interpreted to extend some aspects of the section 136a exclu-
sionary rule to violations of section 136.109 The courts have
not considered the decision to mandate this result, however,
and as a consequence the police continue to question suspects
without warning them of their rights." 0
clear that the federal appeals court, the final arbiter of statutory interpretation, is
prepared to go this far.
103 See C. ROXIN, supra note 25, at 129 (citing authorities).
104 BGH, 25 BGHSt 325.
10$ Section 24 3 (IV) of the Code provides that, at trial, "the defendant will be
informed that he may, but need not, respond to the public charge." STPO § 243(m).
106 It is the normal practice at a German trial to question the defendant about his
personal background before advising him of his right to silence. In this case, the
defendant was charged with vehicular homicide. During the questions about his
background, he related that he had previously been convicted of drunken driving,
and the court relied on this admission in its written judgment. Unlike the American
system, in which the basis of the jury verdict of "guilty" or "not guilty" remains
unexplained, the German system requires the judgment to set forth in detail the facts
and law that form the basis of acquittal or conviction., STPO § 267; see infra pp.
io63-64.
107 Judgment of May 14, 1974, BGH, 25 BGHSt at 331-32. In certain misde-
meanor cases, the defendant need not be represented by counsel. See STPO § 140.
Presumably, in cases in which he is represented, it will be difficult for the defendant
to succeed in claiming ignorance of his right to silence. The instant case was decided
on an abstract question of law and did not reach the issue whether the defendant had
actually been ignorant of his right to silence.
108 Judgment of May 14, 1974, BGH, 25 BGHSt at 331.
109 E.g., C. RoXIN, supra note 25, at 129.
110 This information is derived from interviews conducted by the author. Interview
with a Former German Prosecutor (Apr. 30, 1982); Interview with a German Defense
Attorney (June 1, 1982); Interview with a German Judge (June I, 1982); Interview
with a German Prosecutor, supra note 22. The police usually engage in "informal"
conversation with the defendant "to get his side of the story." Only after this method
has been exhausted do they inform him of his rights to silence and to counsel.
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This widespread disregard of a specific command of the
Code of Criminal Procedure 11 by the police raises an inter-
esting point about the exclusionary rule. In the United States,
where the rule is applied to violations of the Miranda require-
ments, police generally carry and use a "Miranda rights
card"11 2 - even though American police are thought to be
I At least one American scholar has written that the German courts exclude
fewer types of evidence than do American courts because German police officers are
more effectively deterred from misconduct by sanctions of their supervisors and in-
vestigatory bodies; consequently, a judicially imposed exclusionary penalty is not
needed in Germany. See J. LANGBEIN, supra note 2, at 69. It is undoubtedly true
that German police resort to brutality less than their American counterparts do (in
part because they are confronted with less) and have a better relationship with the
citizenry than is typical in the United States. Nevertheless, when it comes to following
the rules governing police conduct as set forth by the legislature and the courts,
empirical research suggests that the German police "are as willing as their American
counterparts to disregard laws and regulations if it appears necessary to 'do the job.'"
Weigend, Continental Cures for American Ailments: European Criminal Procedure as
a Model for Law Reform, in 2 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RE-
SEARCH 381, 398 (N. Morris & M. Tonry eds. i98o) (quoting Hinz, Soziale Deter-
minanten des 'polizeilichen Betriebs,' in DIE POLIZEI: EINE INSTITUTION OFFEN-
TLICHER GEWALT 135, 144 (Arbeitskreis Junger Kriminologen ed. 1975)).
One study found that 65% of German police officers agreed that police work
cannot be performed properly if officers always adhere to the letter of the law. Hinz,
Das Berufs- und Gesellschaftsbild von Polizisten, in DIE POLIZEI: SOZIOLOGISCHE
STUDIEN UND FORSCHUNGSBERICHTE 122, 141 (J. Feest & R. Lautmann eds. 1971).
Hinz also found the "police world view" to be that "there are a lot of people in the
world who enjoy the protection of constitutional rights who don't deserve them."
Hinz, Soziale Determinanten des 'polizeilichen Betriebs,' in DIE POLIZEI: EINE IN-
STITUTION OFFENTLICHER GEWALT 135, 144 (Arbeitskreis Junger Kriminologen ed.
1975). Another study found that the police regard constitutional rights of the accused
as "impediments" to the efficient performance of their duties, impediments to be
"gotten around" whenever possible. W. STEFFEN, ANALYSE POLIZEILICHER ER-
MITTLUNGSTATIGKEIT AUS DER SICHT DES SPATEREN STRAFVERFAHRENS 190 (1976).
The impression gained by the author in interviews with prosecutors, defense attorneys,
and judges is that police discipline is effective in punishing police who are corrupt or
who beat up suspects (and that, consequently, these problems occur infrequently in
Germany) but that it has no effect on conduct such as failing to warn suspects of
their constitutional rights or conducting overly broad searches. Indeed, such police
conduct is apparently rather widespread in Germany and seems to be encouraged by
the police hierarchy. See id. at i88-9o; sources cited supra note Io.
112 The author makes these observations about police behavior on the basis of his
experience as an Assistant United States Attorney in Washington, D.C. See also
Hearings, supra note 3, at 38 (prepared statement of Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney
General of Maryland) (discussing the day-to-day deterrent effect of the exclusionary
rule through prosecutorial oversight of police activities). Similarly, as Professor
LaFave points out, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule on police
is certainly suggested by such post-exclusionary rule occurrences as the dramatic
increase in the use of search warrants where virtually none had been used
before, stepped-up efforts to educate the police on the law of search and seizure
where such training had before been virtually nonexistent, and the creation
and development of working relationships between police and prosecutors to
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less disciplined than their German counterparts." 3 This fact
suggests that, at least in cases in which obeying the rules will
not seriously impede the investigatory process, 114 an exclusion-
ary rule can effectively conform police behavior to the require-
ments of the law. Certainly, there is no other readily apparent
reason that the organized and disciplined German police
widely ignore certain rules while their more unruly American
counterparts generally follow them.
B. Violation of Wiretap Laws
Under the German Constitution, "[s]ecrecy of the mail as
well as secrecy of the postal services and of telecommunications
is inviolable. Restrictions may be ordered only on the basis
of (statute) law."" 5 Wiretapping was flatly prohibited until
1968, when a series of antiterrorist measures - including a
statutj authorizing the use of wiretaps - was enacted in
response to an upsurge in terrorist activities." 6 Germany's
wiretap statute is divided into two parts. The first part, called
the Gio law (because it relates to article io of the Grundgesetz,
or Basic Law), deals with wiretapping for intelligence and
national security purposes. The second part, section iooa of
the Code of Criminal Procedure," 7 deals with wiretapping for
law enforcement purposes. 118
Intelligence authorities may undertake GIo wiretaps only
when there is a factual basis for suspicion that one of a spec-
ified list of criminal offenses involving a threat to national
ensure the obtaining of evidence by means which would not result in its
suppression.
i W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.2, at 26-27 (1978) (citations omitted).
113 See, e.g., J. LANGBEIN, supra note 2, at 69.
114 If conformity to the rules would force police to forgo evidence, the exclusionary
rule would have no effect. The rule simply creates a risk that evidence will be lost
later in court, as opposed to the certainty that it will be lost if police pass it up. As
police are well aware, the risk usually can be greatly reduced by fabrication. See J.
SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
214-15 (2d ed. 1975).
.11S GG art. io.
116 Gesetz zur Beschrdnkung des Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses, in I968
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBI] (compilation of federal statutes and decrees) at
949 (W. Ger.). The law provides that mail may be intercepted under the terms
provided for wiretapping. See generally- Carr, Wiretapping in West Germany, 29 AM.
J. COMP. L. 607 (I98i) (detailed discussion of German wiretap laws).
117 STPO § iooa (translation of the author).
118 This bifurcation is similar to that in the United States, in which wiretapping
for law enforcement purposes is addressed in title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of i968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976 & Supp. V i98i), and
wiretapping for intelligence purposes is addressed in the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ i8oi-i8ii (Supp. IV ig8o).
1054 [Vol. 96:1o32
GERMAN EXCLUSIONARY RULE
security has been or is being committed." 9 The Gio law
contains a specific exclusionary rule providing that evidence
obtained through wiretapping may be used only in the inves-
tigation and prosecution of one of these crimes. 120 Wiretaps
for law enforcement purposes may be performed under section
iooa of the Code of Criminal Procedure when there are "def-
inite facts on which to base the suspicion"'121 that one of a
number of specified crimes has been committed. 122 Although
this part of the statute does not contain an explicit exclusionary
rule, it is settled that, as is true of the Gio law, evidence
obtained by wiretap may be used only to prosecute one of the
listed offenses. 123
The German courts have held that the wiretap statutes are
subject to a stringent exclusionary rule, including a version of
the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine. They have reasoned
that the authorities must be held to the letter of the law
because, except as specifically provided by statute, the consti-
tutional prohibition of wiretapping remains firm. Ambiguous
cases tend to be resolved in favor of the continuing vitality of
the constitutional provision. 124 An example of this judicial
firmness is Judgment of February 22, 1978,125 in which the
federal appeals court considered the presumptively legal wire-
tap of A, who was suspected of participating in a criminal
conspiracy (a listed offense under section iooa of the Code).
The tape revealed only evidence of a nonlisted crime. A was
arrested; the tape was played; and A confessed. He repeated
119 1968 BGBI, Gio, art. 1, § 2, at 949. This list has been strongly criticized for
overbreadth. See Carr, supra note 16, at 614 (citing authorities).
120 1968 BGBI, Gio, art. I, § 7(3), at 95o. This paragraph further provides that,
if after a wiretap has been undertaken to investigate one of the listed crimes, evidence
is obtained of certain other serious crimes (listed in § 138 of the Criminal Code,
STRAFGESETZBUCtI [STGB] (Criminal Code) § 138 (W. Ger.)), this evidence may
also be used. Carr is thus incorrect in his assertion that "the German wiretapping
statutes contain no provisions regulating either the admissibility of conversations
recorded by wiretapping or defining the extent to which or circumstances in which
recorded conversations or derivative evidence may be or become inadmissible," Carr,
supra note ix6, at 638.
121 STPO § iooa (translation of the author). Note the difference between the
standards for a search warrant ("A search may be made . . . if it may be presumed
that such search will lead to the discovery of evidence." STPO § 102), an intelligence
wiretap ("a factual basis for suspicion," 1968 BGB1, Gio, art. i, § 2, at 949), and a
law enforcement wiretap ("definite facts on which to base the suspicion," STPO § iooa
(translation of the author)). This last standard appears to be similar to probable
cause.
122 The listed crimes include counterfeiting, narcotics offenses, and murder. STPO
§ iooa (translation of the author).
123 Judgment of Feb. 22, 1978, BGH, 27 BGHSt 355; see T. KLEINKNECHT,
supra note 28, § iooa, ii.
124 See, e.g., Judgment of Apr. iS, 198o, BGH, 29 BGHSt 244, 249.
125 BGH, 27 BGHSt 355.
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the confession before a judge and affirmed that no pressure
had been brought on him to confess. 126 Nevertheless, the
appellate court not only excluded the tapes themselves, but
also excluded both confessions as, in effect, direct fruits of the
poisonous tree. The court limited the reach of its holding,
however, by observing that, although an interrogation could
not be based on improper evidence, clues obtained from a
wiretap could be used for further investigation, even of non-
listed offenses. 127
This narrow view of the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine
was subsequently expanded in a case involving the news mag-
azine Der Spiegel. 128 Der Spiegel had published an article on
the surveillance of an atomic physicist by the federal Office of
Constitutional Protection. 129 The article was based largely on
leaked government files, and suspicion concerning the source
of the leaks fell on a journalist, F, who was a former employee
of the Office. A Gio wiretap was ordered on F's phone on
the basis of suspicion of anticonstitutional sabotage,130 a listed
offense under the statute. Monitored conversations led law
enforcement officials to believe that F had hidden incriminat-
ing documents at his sister's home. A search order was ob-
tained; the home was searched; and incriminating documents
from the Office of Constitutional Protection were found and
seized. Unfortunately for the authorities, these documents in-
126 Id. at 356. The second confession would therefore have been admissible had
this case involved a violation of STPO § 136a.
127 Judgment of Feb. 22, 1978, BGH, 27 BGHSt at 357-58. In the United States,
in contrast, the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine would require not only that a
confession obtained by confronting the defendant with illegally acquired evidence be
suppressed, but also that use of any clues gathered by illegal police practices be
forbidden.
The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine is in no sense limited to cases in
which there has been a violation of the Fourth Amendment. It has been
utilized with respect to other kinds of constitutional violations as well, such as
unconstitutionally conducted lineups and unconstitutionally obtained confes-
sions. It has also been employed where the secondary evidence was derived
from violation of non-constitution limitations that are commonly implemented
by an exclusionary rule, such as statutory restrictions upon wiretapping and
the McNabb-Mallory rule regarding prompt production of a federal arrestee
before a magistrate.
3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 112, § 114, at 613-14 (footnotes omitted).
128 Judgment of Apr. i8, r98o, BGH, 29 BGHSt 244. Because German case
names do not include party names, cases are referred to by informal names. Thus,
the case involving the seizure of the diary, Judgment of Feb. 21, 1964, BGH, i9
BGHSt 325, discussed at supra pp. 1042-44, is referred to as "the Diary Case."
Because it involved the news magazine Der Spiegel, this case is referred to by that
name.
129 The German Office of Constitutional Protection, or Bundesverfassungsschutz-
amt, is similar to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States but has
more limited powers.
130 STGB § 88.
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criminated F only with respect to certain lesser crimes not
listed in the Gio law. 131 He was convicted of a lesser offense
on the basis of these documents.
On appeal, the court assumed arguendo that the original
wiretap was legal, 132 and observed that evidence obtained
directly from the wiretap could not be used to prosecute a
nonlisted crime. In this case, however, the evidence was ob-
tained indirectly, through the use of clues received from the
wiretap; no actual wiretap evidence was offered in court or
used to extract a confession. Nevertheless, the court excluded
the documents. It noted that the Gio law contains a specific
exclusionary provision and touches on a basic constitutional
right. 133
The courts have taken only a somewhat more permissive
approach in cases involving the use of wiretap evidence against
third parties. In Judgment of March 15, 1976, the federal
court of appeals held that evidence obtained during a legal
wiretap of B could be used against A (who was speaking to
B's wife on the phone), even though there was no prior sus-
picion concerning A. 134 Although the courts have not dealt
with a case in which a wiretap was ordered on the basis of
insufficient evidence, the holding of the Spiegel case - that
wiretap evidence must be excluded unless obtained strictly
according to the terms of the statute - would presumably
govern in this situation as well.
These decisions demonstrate that the lenient approach that
the German courts normally take to police violations of search
and seizure rules is abruptly discarded when wiretaps are
involved. Because the wiretap statute carves out a limited
exception to a specific constitutional prohibition, it must be
strictly construed. Thus, even if the police conform to the
precise terms of the statute in implementing a wiretap, any
resulting evidence will be automatically excluded if it does not
relate to a listed offense. This rigorous approach stands in
131 The documents suggested that F might have violated STGB § 353, the Official
Secrets Act.
132 Judgment of Apr. iS, i98o, BGH, 29 BGHSt at 246.
133 Id. at 249-5o. The court noted that most discussion of the Fernwirkungseffekt,
or fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, had focused on the indirect use of coerced
confessions obtained in violation of STPO § 136a. Judgment of Apr. i8, 198o, BGH,
29 BGHSt at 248. The court noted the split among scholars concerning whether th&
fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine should apply to violations of STPO § 136a, and
cited Knauth, Beweisrechtliche Probleme hei der Verwertung von Abh6rmaterial im
Strafverfahren, 3 NJW 741 (1978), and F. DENCKER, supra note 57, at 76-80, which
suggest that the doctrine should also apply to cases involving confessions obtained in
violation of STPO § 136a.
134 Judgment of Mar. 15, 1976, BGH, 26 BGHSt 298. In cases of this type,
however, A must he charged with a listed offense.
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sharp contrast to the Supreme Court's decision in Scott v.
United States,135 which held that even blatant violation by
federal agents of the statutory "minimization" requirement of
title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968136 would not require exclusion if the challenged wire-
tap was reasonable on the whole.137 The Scott majority per-
formed much as the German courts do in search and seizure
cases: it found that a seizure (the wiretap) in violation of the
applicable statutory rules was "reasonable" under the consti-
tutional standard, and therefore held that exclusion was not
necessary. 138
Thus, "technical" search and seizure violations result in
exclusion in the United States, and "technical" wiretapping
violations result in exclusion in Germany - but not vice versa.
This distinction suggests that the decision to adopt a stringent
exclusionary rule may reflect the relative importance of partic-
ular values within a given legal system. Although both the
German and the American Constitutions contain explicit pro-
visions guaranteeing the physical inviolability of the home, the
comparative laxity of the requirements governing searches in
the Code of Criminal Procedure - as well as the absence of
an exclusionary remedy for violation of these rules - implies
that German legislators and judges place a much lower value
on protecting the security of the home than do their American
counterparts. 139 Wiretapping, on the other hand, is appar-
135 436 U.S. 128 (1978). In Scott, virtually all of the petitioner's conversations
over a one-month period were intercepted, although only 40% of the conversations
related to narcotics.
136 Under American law, wiretaps must be "conducted in such a way as to
minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception."
18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976).
137 436 U.S. at 138-39. In fact, the Supreme Court's approach in Scott resembles
the German courts' balancing approach in search and seizure cases. The apparent
anomaly - the American courts' engaging in a balancing exercise - may be partly
explained by the fact that the German wiretap law contains an explicit exclusionary
rule, whereas the law at issue in Scott did not. Nonetheless, the holding of the
Supreme Court, that violation of a specific statutory command is not itself constitu-
tionally unreasonable, is similar to the German approach in nonwiretap cases.
138 See also United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 755-57 (1979) (holding that
an electronic surveillance by the Internal Revenue Service, performed in violation of
Service regulations, would not lead to suppression if the surveillance on the whole
was "reasonable").
139 It is not readily apparent why the German courts do not emphasize the
inviolability of the home. One possible explanation is that Germany is significantly
more crowded than the United States. Because few of them live in single-family
dwellings, Germans might have a lesser expectation of privacy in their homes than
Americans do. Moreover, because Germans have more respect for the police (and a
better disciplined police force), they might not be as disturbed as Americans are by
the thought of police officers' looking through their homes for evidence.
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ently regarded as a more serious intrusion upon individual
rights in Germany than it is in the United States, as the specific
proscription in the German Constitution suggests. Therefore,
wiretapping is subject to a stricter exclusionary rule in the
former country than in the latter.
C. Violations of the Rights of Witnesses
The German Code of Criminal Procedure also contains a
series of rules protecting witnesses who enjoy a privileged
personal or professional relationship with the accused. These
privileges exist for the benefit of the witness and may be
waived by him over the objection of the defendant. 140 A
failure by the authorities to advise the witness of his rights,
however, will result in exclusion of any statement he has
given, even though the statutes contain no explicit exclusionary
provision. 14 1 Because these statutory rules explicate constitu-
tional principles 42 and because their violation leads to the
exclusion of otherwise competent and relevant evidence, they
are appropriate for inclusion in this discussion.
Section 52(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides
that fiancrs, spouses (including divorced spouses), and anyone
140 See, e.g., Judgment of May 12, 1922, Reichsgericht, Ger., 57 Entscheidungen
des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen [RGSt] (decisions of predecessor to federal appeals
court) 63, 64; 1 LOWE-ROSENBERG, supra note 24, § 52, 22. The German rule
differs from the American approach, in which the spousal and attorney-client privi-
leges are privileges of the defendant. See McCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 83, at 169-70 (2d ed. 1972).
141 Judgment of Mar. I6, i977, BGH, 27 BGHSt 139, 141. If a witness is not
warned of his right to refuse to make a statement against his brother (the accused),
the defendant is permitted to suppress the witness' statement at trial. German cases
do not explain why the accused may exclude his brother's pretrial statement, obtained
without warning in violation of STPO § 52, but may not exclude his own statement,
obtained without warning in violation of STPO § 136. See supra pp. 1051-52. It is
probable that use of the brother's statement in court is thought likely to cause
additional damage to the familial relationship, whereas use of the defendant's own
statement does not further interfere with his statutory right to have been informed of
his right to remain silent at the time of interrogation. Nevertheless, because the
failure to warn also trenches upon the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination
at trial, as the United States Supreme Court recognized in Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), this formulation is not entirely satisfactory.
142 GG art. I, para. i (providing that the dignity of man is inviolable); id. art. 2,
para. I (protecting the free development of the personality). In the case of family
members, a third constitutional provision provides that "marriage and family are
under the special protection of the state." Id. art. 6, para. i; see T. KLEINKNECHT,
supra note 28, § 52, i-3; H. KVHNE, STRAFPROZESSUALE BEWEISVERBOTE UND
ART. I I GRUNDGESETZ 64 (1970); cf. McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE, supra note 140, H8 87, 98 (describing the uncertain common law roots of
the American attorney-client and doctor-patient privileges). The German privileges
have a constitutional basis; their American counterparts do not.
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related directly to the accused by blood, marriage, or adoption
(or related collaterally by blood to the third degree or by
marriage to the second degree) are entitled to refuse to tes-
tify. 14 3 These persons must be instructed, before interrogation,
concerning their privilege to refuse to testify,144 and they may
revoke a waiver of the privilege at any time during their
interrogation. 145 Failure to warn a witness of this right will
result in exclusion of his statement from evidence upon motion
of the defendant, either at the intermediate proceeding or at
trial. 146 These provisions provide a more extensive testimonial
protection for the family than is found in American law.147
Moreover, section 53 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
provides that a large number of individuals who either have
or have had a professional relationship with the defendant,
including dentists and tax advisers as well as doctors and
lawyers, are similarly privileged. 148 This provision is subject
to an exclusionary rule similar to that applied in section 52.
An example of the operation of this privilege is Judgment of
May 12, 1922,149 in which the court held that statements
obtained during interrogation of the defendant's doctor, with-
out advising him of his right to refuse to speak to the author-
ities, could be suppressed at trial on motion of the defen-
dant. 15 0
143 In addition, STPO § 8ic provides that a privileged person may also refuse a
physical examination aimed at obtaining evidence against the accused. STPO §
8ic(III). Again, failure to warn the witness of his right to refuse will result in
exclusion. See I LOWE-ROSENBERG, supra note 24, § 8ic, 61 (citing cases). All
nonprivileged witnesses may be examined without their consent only to verify whether
there is a specific trace or consequence of a punishable act on their body. STPO
§ 8ic(I).
144 STPO § 52(11).
145 Id.
146 The right to silence of a relative of the accused is a fundamental right of the
relative founded on the Rechtsstaatsprinzip. Judgment of July 3, 1962, BGH, 17
BGHSt 337, 348.
147 Cf. MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, supra note 140,
§ 8o, at 166 (marital privilege fails if any third party, including a child of the marriage
who is old enough to understand, is present at the communication).
148 STPO § 53(I). The list also includes members of the Bundestag (the German
parliament), tax advisers, accountants, pharmacists, and members of the media to
whom the suspect might have given information. Section 53a(I) of the Code provides
that the assistants of some of these people are also privileged. STPO § 53(a)(I).
149 Reichsgericht, Ger., 57 RGSt 63, 64.
150 Id. The defendant's right to demand that fair procedures be used against him
does not enable him to suppress statements of witnesses (other than those of privileged
persons, such as a relative or a lawyer) who have not been warned by the police of
their own privilege against self-incrimination, a warning required by STPO § 55. See
Judgment of Jan. 21, 1958, BGH, ir BGHSt 213. The court explained that this
privilege was too far removed from the sphere of legal protection surrounding the
defendant to allow him to protest its violation. Id. at 2 16-i8. This decision has been
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If a witness falling into one of the categories described in
section 52 or 53 gives a statement to the police and then
decides that he does not want to testify at trial, his statement
cannot be read into evidence. 151 Nor can the police testify
concerning the existence or content of such a statement. i5 2
Hence a strict exclusionary rule, not specifically dictated by
the statute, applies to exclude prior statements to the police,
including those given with proper warnings, if the privileged
person elects not to testify at trial. In contrast, the American
system permits neither the defendant nor a privileged witness
to prevent the admission of a statement obtained legally by
the police. 153
Further protection for the defendant's privacy is supplied
by section 97, which provides that written communications
between the accused and a privileged person are not subject
to seizure.' 5 4 Although the testimonial privileges afforded by
sections 52 and 53 specifically provide for the exclusion of
relevant testimony, the provisions of section 97 contain no
vigorously criticized. See, e.g., G6ssel, supra note 57, at 652-53. Nevertheless, the
result - which amounts to a denial of standing - makes more sense in Germany,
where the focus of exclusion is on shielding the privacy rights of the defendant, than
it would in the United States, where the Supreme Court has asserted that the basis
of the exclusionary rule is deterrence of police misconduct, see United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974), and has nevertheless refused to deter such
misconduct in certain cases in which it found that the defendant lacked standing.
See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-38 (1978). See generally Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 356-72 (1974) (dis-
cussing the role of deterrence in the Supreme Court's fourth amendment jurispru-
dence).
151 STPO § 252. This rule applies even if the witness becomes engaged to the
accused (and hence privileged) after giving his initial statement to the police. Judg-
ment of June 20, 1979, BGH, 198o NJW 67, 68.
1s2 Judgment of Jan. 15, 1952, BGH, 2 BGHSt 99. There is one exception: if a
statement was made before a judge, the judge may testify about its contents. Id. at
ioi; see T. KLEINKNECHT, supra note 28, § 252, 2-8 (citing cases). If a privileged
witness dies before trial, his earlier statement to the police may be used, assuming
that he knowingly waived his right to silence when he gave the statement. STPO
§ 251(1)(1); T. KLEINKNECHT, supra note 28, § 252, 4.
153 Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring exclusion of statements
illegally obtained).
154
The following objects are not subject to seizure:
I. written communications between the accused and persons who may refuse
testimony pursuant to § 52 or § 53, subs. I, clauses I to 3;
2. notes, made by persons specified in § 53, subs. I, clauses i to 3 concerning
information confided to them by the accused, or concerning other circumstances
to which their right to refuse testimony pertains;
3. other objects including records of medical examinations, covered by the




explicit exclusionary rule, and violation of a rule governing
searches and seizures by the police does not necessarily lead
to exclusion.' 5 5 Nevertheless, this protection gave rise to the
initial judicially created exclusionary rule in Germany in 1889,
some twenty-five years before the American rule was first
enunciated in Weeks.15 6 In Judgment of November 7, 889,157
the defendant was charged with a crime that involved writing
an anonymous letter. The police conducted a properly autho-
rized search of the home of the defendant's parents and seized
a letter from the defendant to his parents. The letter was
admitted at trial simply as a handwriting exemplar, not for its
content, and the defendant was convicted. Basing its decision
on the prohibition of seizure of written communications be-
tween the accused and his relatives, the court reversed and
held that such evidence not only could not be seized, but also
could not be used at trial.' 5 8
The principal function of the exclusionary rules concerning
witness privileges, like that of the other rules discussed above,
is not to deter police misconduct, but to maintain a suitable
balance between the defendant's privacy and relational rights
and the state's interest in prosecuting crime. The courts'
method of striking this balance is illustrated by Judgment of
March 28, 1973,159 in which the federal appeals court held
that evidence seized in violation of section 97 may be used at
trial if it later develops that the owner of the documents in
question was an accomplice of the defendant - even if the
police were unaware of this fact at the time of the seizure. 160
Because privacy is the principal concern of the German sys-
tem, the courts focus their attention on the known facts at the
time of the most significant invasion of privacy - the time
when the evidence is to be used at trial. A deterrence-oriented
system, in contrast, would have excluded the evidence on the
ground that the police acted wrongfully based on what they
knew when the documents were originally seized.
155 See supra pp. 1040-41.
156 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
157 Reichsgericht, Ger., 20 RGSt 91.
158 Id. at 92. This case remains good law. See i LOWE-ROSENBERG, supra note
24, § 97, 62.
159 BGH, 25 BGHSt I68.
160 Id. at 17o. Restrictions concerning seizures of paper do not apply if the "persons




III. PROCEDURAL WEAKNESSES OF THE GERMAN SYSTEM
Certain characteristics of the German system arise from the
central role played by the judge in German criminal trials,
and detract from the effective operation of the German exclu-
sionary rules. The judge, not the attorneys, is the principle
presenter of evidence. 161 He prepares the case in advance by
reading through the entire file, including evidence that has
been or will be "excluded" from use at trial. 162 There is no
jury at the trial itself, and any motions for the suppression of
evidence that the defense might wish to raise are presented to
the same panel of judges 63 that will ultimately decide the
case. 164 If any of these requests is granted, the presiding judge
instructs the other judges to disregard the excluded evi-
dence; 165 the trial proceeds; and the panel then decides the
issue of guilt or innocence.
Although this procedure might discourage some suppression
motions, 166 it is not as empty as it might sound. In Germany,
the verdict of the court must be justified by a written opinion
setting forth the reasons for the decision in detail.' 67 If sup-
pressed evidence constitutes a substantial part of the prose-
cution's case, the court may not be able to defend a guilty
161 "The presiding judge conducts the trial; he examines the defendant and he
receives the evidence." STPO § 238(f).
162 Although there is no express authorization for this practice, it is universally
understood that nothing is excluded from the file. Interview with a German Judge,
supra note ixo; Interview with a German Prosecutor, supra note 22.
163 The least serious criminal cases are tried before a single judge. GERICHTSVER-
FASSUNGSGESETZ [GVEaFG] (court organization law) § 25 (IV. Ger.); see T.
KLEINKNECHT, supra note 28, at 1029. A court (Schbffengericht) composed of one
professional judge and two lay judges (ordinary citizens) sits in more serious cases.
GVERFG § 29. In the most serious cases, tried in the Grosse Strafkammer (great
criminal chamber), the court is composed of three professional and two lay judges.
GVEnFG §§ 74, 76. The chief judge typically designates one of the two associate
judges to study the case before trial and to draft an opinion afterward. See J.
LANGBEIN, supra note 2, at 62-63. At least two-thirds of the court must agree on a
guilty verdict at each of these levels. STPO § 263(I).
164 STPO § 304; see GVERFG § 73; i L6WE-RoSENERG, supra note 24, § 98,
54. Because the lay judges do not hav access to the file, evidence that is suppressed
before trial might not come to their attention. There is nothing, however, to stop the
presiding judge from telling them about it during the secret decisionmaking process.
165 See sources cited supra note no. But cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.
123, 137 (1968) (recognizing the futility of such an instruction).
166 If the exclusionary claim is not raised in court, the lay judges will not have
the disputed evidence called to their attention as evidence that the defense attorney
is especially eager to keep out. Interview with a German Defense Attorney, supra
note iio.
167 STPO § 267.
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verdict in writing and may be forced to acquit 168 - regardless
of the court's own feelings about the defendant's guilt. If,
however, the suppressed evidence is not obviously necessary
to support a finding of guilt but is in reality the dispositive
factor in the minds of the fact finders - as might be true with
regard to a confession supported by sufficient, but not over-
whelming, evidence - defendants who should have been ac-
quitted may be convicted nonetheless. This weakness is not a
function of the exclusionary rules themselves, however, but
rather of the structure of the trial process in Germany.
IV. CONCLUSION
The case law and statutes discussed in this Article clearly
establish that, contrary to the traditional view, Germany in
fact has a well-developed system of exclusionary rules founded
on constitutional principles and statutory provisions. The Ger-
man and the American exclusionary rules both reflect the fun-
damental principle that relevant evidence must occasionally be
excluded to safeguard constitutional rights, but the rules some-
times differ significantly in the scope of protection that they
afford. The German rule, for example, is less stringent than
the American rule in excluding evidence derived from im-
proper searches of the home, and the failure to give Miranda-
type warnings to suspects generally will not result in exclusion
in Germany. On the other hand, in comparison to their Amer-
ican counterparts, the German courts afford significantly
greater protection to witnesses with personal or professional
ties to the defendant and are stricter in suppressing evidence
obtained in violation of wiretapping statutes. The German
courts have also defined a doctrine of personal privacy that
will cause certain private material, such as diaries, to be ex-
cluded even when such material has been obtained legally.
The two systems converge, however, in their treatment of
coerced confessions and evidence obtained through brutality or
deceit.
The mechanics of the German and American systems also
reflect both similarities and differences. Germany's statutory
exclusionary rules operate automatically, much like the Amer-
ican rule: if the police have violated the law, any resulting
evidence will be excluded without regard to other considera-
tions. In cases in which general constitutional principles are
the basis for exclusion, however, the only police conduct that
168 Although such acquittals are unusual, they are not altogether unknown. See
sources cited supra note iio.
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leads to automatic exclusion in Germany is a seizure that
violates the Rechtsstaatsprinzip through brutality or deceit. In
all other situations, in dramatic contrast to the American sys-
tem, the fact that evidence was legally or illegally obtained is
not dispositive. The decision to admit or suppress will be
determined by balancing the relative importance of the defen-
dant's privacy rights against the seriousness of the offense
charged.
Would some variant of the German system be workable
and effective in the United States? Some aspects of the Ger-
man system certainly offer an appealing contrast to the current
operation of the American exclusionary rule. The German
approach avoids the most serious objection to the American
system - the release of dangerous criminals simply because
of what frequently are technical blunders by law enforcement
officials. In cases that do not involve a statutory exclusionary
rule, neither mistakes by the police nor even intentional vio-
lations of the Code of Criminal Procedure automatically result
in exclusion, particularly in cases involving serious crimes.
Nonetheless, because evidence that is obtained through gross
abuses - such as police conduct involving brutality or deceit
- is excluded by the Rechtsstaatsprinzip, the German system
avoids the other extreme as well - sacrificing fundamental
constitutional rights in the name of "law and order." The
German approach is also attractive because it recognizes the
importance of preserving the defendant's privacy rights, even
when the challenged evidence has been legally obtained. Fi-
nally, because the American fact finder is not made aware of
excluded evidence, the concepts underlying the German system
might operate more effectively under the American system
than they do in Germany itself.
Of course, there would be serious problems with any at-
tempt to adopt some variant of the German system for use in
the United States. Whatever the deterrent effect on police
misconduct of the American exclusionary rule, 169 the balancing
approach employed by the German courts would have a lesser
effect. The German system also reflects a comparative in-
difference to the legality of the original search, an indifference
that is not in keeping with established traditions in this coun-
try. Other aspects of the German system - such as the ex-
169 Studies of the deterrent effect of the American rule are inconclusive. Compare
S. SCHLESINGER, ExCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE 50-56 (1977) (concluding that rule has
not been an effective deterrent), with Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an "Illogical"
or "Unnatural" Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDICATURE 67, 70-73
(1978) (challenging the validity of studies that dispute the rule's deterrent effect).
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tensive familial privileges - may also reflect cultural traditions
that have little applicability in the United States. 170
Another difficulty with seeking to adapt the German ap-
proach to American conditions arises out of an important struc-
tural difference between the federal systems of the two coun-
tries. Although Germany, like the United States, is a federal
republic, its criminal law and procedural rules are promulgated
nationally. Thus, the German national legislature can pass
rules of criminal procedure that apply in all of the Ldnder
(states). In the United States, on the other hand, there are
serious questions whether Congress has the power to impose
criminal procedural rules on the states. 171 Thus, the "rules"
governing searches and seizures, interrogations, and the like
in the United States have been the products of the Supreme
Court's constitutional interpretation; to break the rules is to
violate the Constitution. Although German courts can there-
fore distinguish between rule-breaking and constitutional vio-
lations under the proportionality principle and apply an exclu-
sionary rule only in the latter category, 172 American courts
lack the legal basis for drawing distinctions between "more
and less serious" constitutional violations in applying the
rule. 173
The existence of a detailed system of exclusionary rules in
Germany suggests that the Weeks rule is neither a bizarre
aberration nor the only form that a viable exclusionary rule
can take. It indicates that exclusionary rules are a reflection
of shared democratic principles, even though the rules' partic-
ular provisions vary according to context and tradition. The
German experience thus represents an important reference
point that can help to free the ongoing debate over the Amer-
ican exclusionary rule from its current rigidity.
170 A strong concern for familial rights is pervasive in German law. For instance,
STPO § 395(H1) provides that the parents, children, brothers, sisters, or spouse of a
homicide victim may join as intervenors in the public charge. See generally J.
DAwsON, GIFTS AND PROMISES 127 (1980) (discussing the traditional importance of
the family in German estate distribution).
171 Cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (976) (invalidating
extension of federal minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to state and
municipal employees on grounds of state sovereignty and local autonomy).
172 The German courts do not, however, take full advantage of this dichotomy;
as noted, they admit evidence that is the product of unconstitutional searches on the
theory that only the seizure, and not the search, actually produces the evidence. See
supra pp. 1046-47.
173 See, e.g., Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 56o (1971) (holding that probable
cause must appear on the face of the search warrant and, if it does not, that evidence
obtained pursuant to that warrant must be excluded, even if police had probable
cause).
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